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Abstract: What are the connections between the successful performance 
of illocutionary acts and audience understanding or uptake of their 
performance? According to one class of proposals, audience 
understanding suffices for successful performance. I explain how those 
proposals emerge from earlier work and seek to clarify some of their 
interrelations. 
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1. Introduction.  
The aims in light of which one attempts to tell someone something 
characteristically include the aim of being understood. How should we 
understand that aim? And is it a necessary or sufficient condition for 
successfully telling someone something that one achieves it? On the natural 
assumption that telling is a form of illocutionary act, those questions interact 
with more general questions about illocution. Is it a necessary or sufficient 
condition on successfully performing any illocutionary act that one achieves 
uptake—that one’s audience understands one’s attempt to perform it? And 
can the bounds of the illocutionary be specified by appeal to operative uptake 
conditions? My aim is to gain clarity about some answers that have been 
offered to these questions as a step towards addressing them. 
I proceed historically, beginning with J. L. Austin (§2), and then 
explaining, first, how Paul Grice’s approach to illocution might be seen as an 
attempt to build on Austin’s (§3), and, second, how John Searle’s, John 
McDowell’s, and Jennifer Hornsby’s approaches build on Grice’s (§4). §5 
takes stock by setting out some of the options that emerge from the foregoing 
and raising a question about telling. 
 
 
2. Austin.  
We often perform one act in order to perform others. Thus, for example, one 
might boil a kettle in order to make tea. Similarly, in the case of acts of 
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speech, one might ask someone the time in order to arrive fashionably late. 
And one might state one thing in order to insinuate another, and do the latter, 
in turn, in order to offend an eavesdropper. Where one thing is done in order 
to do another, both are done intentionally. But a similar structure can be 
discerned in which at least some of the things that are done are not done 
intentionally. For example, one might upset someone unintentionally by—
again, unintentionally—revealing something about their partner, and do the 
latter by telling them that Smith is an embezzler; and one might do that, in 
turn, by saying that Smith is an embezzler, and do that by uttering the 
sentence, “Smith is an embezzler.”  
Austin thought that it would be worthwhile to impose a structure on 
such chains of things that can be done by speaking, by distinguishing three 
kinds amongst such acts: locutionary acts; illocutionary acts; and 
perlocutionary acts. To a first approximation, his idea was that illocutionary 
acts are the fundamentally communicative things we do, while locutionary 
and perlocutionary acts are conditions and consequences, respectively, of the 
performance of illocutionary acts. The performance of locutionary acts is a 
characteristic requirement on the performance of illocutionary acts—so that 
we can perform illocutionary acts in performing locutionary acts. Thus, we 
might tell someone that their collar is crooked in saying that their collar is 
crooked. And the performance of perlocutionary acts is a further consequence 
of the performance of illocutionary (and perhaps locutionary) acts, so that we 
can perform perlocutionary acts by performing illocutionary acts. Thus, we 
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might induce someone to fix their collar by telling them that it is crooked. 
(Austin 1962.) 
Austin was not satisfied that he had successfully delineated a sharp 
boundary around the illocutionary acts (Austin 1962: 99, 121–132). And 
others have agreed that Austin’s appeal to the distinction between things we 
do in, and things we do by, doing other things is too blunt an instrument to 
achieve this aim. (See e.g. Hornsby 1994: 189. See also Bird 1981; Hornsby 
1988.) However, an important class of attempts to improve on Austin’s have 
built on a further idea of his, according to which illocutionary acts might be 
marked out from others by their especially close association with audience 
uptake. The idea surfaces in the following two passages: 
 
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have 
been happily, successfully performed. This is not to say that the 
illocutionary act is the achieving of some effect. I cannot be said to have 
warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a 
certain sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the 
illocutionary act is to be carried out. How should we put it best here? 
And how should we limit it? Generally the effect amounts to bringing 
about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution. 
So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of 





it is always possible, for example, to try to thank or inform somebody 
yet in different ways to fail, because he doesn’t listen, or takes it as 
ironical, or wasn’t responsible for whatever it was, and so on. (Austin 
1962: 106.) 
 
Although Austin touches here on the idea that illocutionary acts are 
distinctively subject to an uptake requirement, his discussion is brief and 
elusive. He doesn’t make plain either the precise nature or the generality of 
the uptake requirement. As Maximilian de Gaynesford notes, Austin’s 
opening sentence elides his own distinction between failures to perform—
Austin’s misfires—and unhappy but otherwise successful performances—
Austin’s abuses (de Gaynesford 2011: 123). It thereby fails to make clear 
whether the uptake condition is a necessary condition on performance or only 
on felicitous performance. (On a natural construal of abuses, they would 
involve representing oneself in a misleading way. For example, in asserting, 
one might represent oneself as knowing, so that, if one failed to know, one 
would thereby have abused the capacity so to represent oneself. Unless one 
were willing to allow that in telling, one represents oneself as being 
understood, that model would not apply to otherwise felicitous attempts at 
telling that failed to achieve uptake. In that case, the category of successful 
but unhappy performances would be wider than the category of abuses.)  
Furthermore, it isn’t clear whether Austin intends the uptake condition 
to apply generally to all illocutionary acts. He explicitly affirms uptake as a 
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necessary condition on performance only with respect to the act of warning. 
And the definite article in the immediately following sentence—“if the 
illocutionary act is to be carried out”—indicates that the necessary condition 
it imposes is restricted to that possibly special case. Similarly, the concluding 
sentence tells us only that performance “involves the securing of uptake,” 
rather than that it requires uptake, whilst the preceding sentence’s opening 
“generally” suggests that “bringing about the understanding of the meaning 
and of the force of the locution” may be only a special case of uptake. Finally, 
in the second quotation, Austin suggests that audience understanding of the 
non-ironical force of an utterance might be necessary for thanking and 
informing, but again leaves open that those two acts might be special cases.  
At first sight, Austin seems to take a firmer stand here: 
 
Moreover, comparing stating to what we have said about the 
illocutionary act, it is an act to which, just as much as to other 
illocutionary acts, it is essential to ‘secure uptake’: the doubt about 
whether I stated something if it was not heard or understood is just the 
same as the doubt about whether I warned sotto voce or protested if 
someone did not take it as a protest, &c. (Austin 1962: 139.) 
 
However, Austin’s purpose here is to defend the view that stating is 
susceptible to the same requirements as other examples of illocutionary acts, 
whatever they are, rather than to defend any particular views about those 
requirements beyond those that he had expressed earlier and which we have 
 8 
just considered. Thus, although Austin seems at first explicit that “it is 
essential” to secure uptake, he does not make clear whether he takes uptake 
to be essential to the performance of illocutionary acts, or only to their 
felicitous performance. And rather than making the straightforward claim that 
one who was not heard or understood could not have stated, Austin avers only 
that the same doubt attends their having done so as attends other cases in 
which uptake is absent. (For illuminating further discussion, see de 
Gaynesford 2011: 122–125.) 
 
3. Grice. 
Austin’s guardedness notwithstanding, it has seemed to some other theorists 
that reflection on uptake might provide the key to unlocking illocution. Grice, 
in particular, has presented an account of the constitutive conditions on the 
communicative act of meaning something that, on natural assumptions, gives 
rise to an account of distinctively communicative acts on which a form of 
uptake is both necessary and sufficient for successful performance. 
Grice’s stated aim in presenting his account is to specify necessary and 
sufficient conditions for someone’s meaning something in, or by, doing 
something else—say, uttering some words. This is what Grice calls non-
natural or speaker meaning, meaningNN. However, he makes clear that a 
central target of his account is the putatively illocutionary act of telling: 
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What we want to find is the difference between, for example, 
“deliberately and openly letting someone know” and “telling” and 
between “getting someone to think” and “telling.” (Grice 1957: 218.) 
 
So, it is natural, if not inevitable, to treat Grice’s proposal as part of an 
attempt to characterise a range of distinctively illocutionary acts, including 
telling, in the performance of which someone meansNN something. (The 
initial impetus for this treatment of Grice’s account, as an attempted 
elaboration of Austin’s, comes from Strawson 1964. In pursuing the line of 
descent from Austin that goes via Grice, I largely ignore those lines that focus 
on another aspect of Austin’s discussion, also highlighted by Strawson: his 
idea that illocutionary acts are distinctively conventional. As will become 
apparent during the following discussion, however, Grice’s own proposal 
cannot be accepted as it stands, and the successor proposals to be considered 
have important commonalities with more explicitly convention-based 
approaches. For further discussion and development of convention-based 
approaches, see e.g. Bauer 2015; Bird 1981; Crary 2007; Langton 1993; 
Laugier 2017.) 
Grice summarises his proposal in the following way: 
 
Shortly, perhaps, we may say that “A meantNN something by x” is 
roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief 
by means of the recognition of this intention.” (Grice 1957: 219.) 
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Here, Grice specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for the act of 
meaning something, by appeal to the intentions with which a distinct act, the 
act of uttering, is performed. His proposal entails that it is necessary and 
sufficient for successfully attaining one’s ends in meaning something that 
one’s communicative intention—to have this communicative intention 
recognised—be recognised. In that sense, success requires uptake. However, 
Grice’s account allows that one can successfully perform an act of meaning 
something—for example, an act of telling—whether or not one’s intentions 
are recognised. What is required for successful performance of the act is only 
that one act with the required communicative intentions. It is not required, in 
addition, that the ends set by those intentions are achieved.  
However, it is natural to hold that where an act cannot be performed 
except with specific intentions, then that is because the ends set by those 
intentions are constitutive ends of the act itself, and not merely essential 
accompaniments. Why else should it be that performance of the act is 
dependent on acting with those very intentions? Accordingly, it is natural to 
hold that since an act of meaning can be performed only by someone with the 
communicative intentions that Grice describes, it is a constitutive end of the 
act of meaning something that the intentions with which it is undertaken be 
recognised. For example, if it is impossible to tell someone something unless 
one does so with the communicative intentions that Grice specifies, then it is 
natural to think that that is because those intentions are required in order 
intentionally to tell someone something. But it is natural to think that that is 
so only because intending to tell someone something is intending to achieve 
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the constitutive ends of telling someone something, which include 
recognition of the performance of that very act. In that case, successful 
performance of an act of meaning something—for example, an act of telling 
someone something—requires more than mere accompaniment by 
appropriate communicative intentions. It requires, in addition, that the 
constitutive ends of one’s act be achieved. So, on this alternative treatment of 
Grice’s proposal, it is construed as an account of what speakers intentionally 
do, or try to do, rather than as an account of what they merely intend to (try 
to) do. (A defender of Grice’s own presentation of his proposal might prefer 
to view his account as an account of a system of accompanying intentions 
rather than of a kind of act. However, Grice’s proposal would then lose its 
potential bearing on the bounds of illocution and its hope of characterising 
the act of telling.) 
We can approach this alternative treatment of Grice’s proposal from a 
slightly different direction. A worry that is sometimes raised about Grice’s 
proposal is that it makes meaning something too easy, since someone might 
in principle intend more or less anything by more or less any performance. 
For example, one might produce a squeak with the communicative intentions 
that might otherwise have accompanied one’s telling one’s audience that 
Peano Arithmetic is incomplete. Although it would ordinarily be 
unreasonable to expect one’s audience to recognise the communicative 
intentions with which one squeaked, having sufficiently unusual beliefs about 
one’s audience might make it possible so to intend. Since it seems implausible 
that one meant anything by one’s squeak—and especially implausible that, in 
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squeaking, one told one’s audience that Peano Arithmetic is incomplete—
there is a difficulty here for Grice’s proposal. One sort of response would be 
to add to Grice’s account the condition that its subjects must be reasonable. 
But it is a short step from there to the requirement that, in order for one’s 
communicative intentions to be reasonable, the act one performs with those 
intentions must be suitable to enable one’s audience to recognise the 
intentions with which one acts. And that leads, by another route, to the 
alternative view, on which meaning something is performing an act the 
constitutive end of which is the recognition of the communicative ends with 
which it is undertaken. (We’ll return below to a possible weakening of this 
proposal, on which the constitutive aim of the act of telling is making one’s 
communicative intentions recognisable, rather than having them recognised.) 
Even if we treat Grice’s proposal as an account of the nature of a range 
of specifically communicative acts, it faces a fundamental difficulty that is 
disguised by the formulation on which we have focused to this point. 
According to that formulation, the intentions with which one acts when one 
means something include the intention of inducing a belief in one’s audience. 
However, acting with that intention is an almost trivial corollary of acting 
with the intention that one’s intention be recognised. For recognising what 
someone intends is a way of knowing, or coming to know, what they intend; 
and knowing what someone intends plausibly requires believing that which 
one knows. So, the presently operative statement of Grice’s proposal serves 
to disguise a problem that arises when more is said about the beliefs one who 
means something must intend to instil. 
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As is well known, Grice says more about the target beliefs. Focusing 
on the case of broadly assertoric communicative intentions, including those 
required for telling someone something, Grice wavers between requiring of 
one who asserts that p the intention to induce in their audience the belief that 
p, and requiring of them the intention to induce in their audience the belief 
that they (the speaker) believe that p. (See e.g. Grice 1968: 123, 1982: 300.) 
Grice is forced into making a proposal of this sort by the ambitious nature of 
his project. For his project is not only to account for what is distinctive of 
illocutionary acts, but also to provide accounts of the variety of specific acts 
that fall within that boundary. He therefore needs to explain the differences 
amongst those specific acts, including, for example, the difference between 
telling someone something and asking them something. And now given that 
he aims to provide that explanation by appeal to speakers’ intentions, his 
resources are quite limited. He cannot appeal to the marker of communicative 
intentions in general—that they are intentions to have themselves be 
recognised—since, being general, that marker fails to discriminate amongst 
communicative acts. He is therefore forced to appeal to audience directed 
intentions that are able to discriminate amongst communicative acts. And it 
is more or less inevitable at that stage to seek to account for what is distinctive 
of broadly assertoric communicative acts, including the act of telling, by 
appeal to intentions to induce in one’s audience states of belief or knowledge 
either concerning the subject matter of the telling or concerning the speaker’s 
own beliefs about that subject matter. 
 14 
Given his ambitious project, then, Grice is compelled to adopt the view 
that in order to tell someone something, one must act with the intention that 
one’s audience form an appropriate belief or acquire appropriate knowledge. 
The difficulty now is that, although intending that one’s audience acquire the 
sorts of beliefs or knowledge that figure in Grice’s proposal is quite 
characteristic of the act of telling, it is not obviously a necessary or 
constitutive condition.  
Ian Rumfitt offers the following case: 
 
In the course of their interrogation by the police, it must have become 
clear very quickly to the members of the Birmingham Six that nothing 
they could do or say would persuade their interlocutors either that they 
(the suspects) had not planted the bombs or that they (the suspects 
again) believed that they had not planted the bombs. For all that, when 
they uttered the words “We did not plant the bombs”, the suspects 
certainly meant that they did not plant the bombs, and asserted as much. 
(Rumfitt 1995: 834.) 
 
One cannot intend something that one knows (or believes) to be impossible. 
Since the suspects in the case that Rumfitt presents knew that it was 
impossible for them to induce in their audience either the belief that they had 
not planted the bombs, or the belief that they believe that they had not planted 
the bombs, the suspects could not speak with the intention of inducing such 
beliefs. Nonetheless, it is plausible that they were able to undertake a form of 
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telling their interrogators that they did not plant the bombs. (Rumfitt 1995: 
832–834. See also McDowell 1980: 37–41; Searle 1969: 46–47; Strawson 
1964: 398–399. We’ll return in §5 to the question whether something like 
Grice’s condition might hold of other forms of telling.) 
This difficulty arises because the resources to which Grice appeals are 
inadequate to characterise a minimal form of telling. At best, those resources 
are able to specify characteristic, but inessential, further ends of episodes of 
that form of telling. That is, they provide an account not of that illocutionary 
act of telling, but rather of a characteristic class of perlocutionary acts that are 
performed by means of that act. However, the failure of Grice’s ambitious 
analytic project leaves intact his contribution to the more modest project of 
characterising the general distinction between illocutionary and other speech 
acts. For purposes of that project, differences amongst the various specific 
illocutionary acts can be taken as primitive. (See e.g. McDowell 1980: 42.) 
Grice’s contribution to the more modest project is then the idea that the act of 
telling, and so the intention to tell, incorporates the constitutive end of having 
one’s act understood. Thus, the lines of objection to Grice considered here 
provide convergent support for approaches according to which the natures of 
acts of telling, and of illocutionary acts more generally, explain, rather than 
being explained by, the intentions with which speakers act. (For further, 
broadly convergent critical discussion of Grice’s ambitious project, see 




4. Searle, McDowell, and Hornsby. 
Searle presents the consequent picture of the communicative function of 
telling in the following way: 
 
Human communication has some extraordinary properties, not shared 
by most other kinds of human behaviour. One of the most extraordinary 
is this: If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain 
conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognises that I am trying to tell 
him something and exactly what it is I am trying to tell him, I have 
succeeded in telling it to him. Furthermore, unless he recognises that I 
am trying to tell him something and what I am trying to tell him, I do 
not fully succeed in telling it to him. (Searle 1969: 47.) 
 
On this view, both illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are bound up with 
effects, but the illocutionary acts constitutively involve only what Searle calls 
the distinctively “illocutionary effect” of one’s audience understanding one’s 
act (Searle 1969: 47). 
Like Austin’s putative endorsement of uptake as a necessary condition 
for performance of an illocutionary act, Searle’s presentation of necessary 
and sufficient conditions is qualified. First, he characterises the conditions 
with respect only to the specific act of telling, rather than with respect to a 
more general class of illocutionary acts, thus leaving open that different 
conditions might apply to different acts. (Indeed, his proposal about telling 
would be consistent with denying that telling is an illocutionary act.) Second, 
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the sufficient condition is qualified by the parenthetical requirement that 
“certain conditions are satisfied”. Searle’s thought here seems to be that in 
order to suffice for understanding, recognition must be the upshot of a special 
sensitivity to a restricted class of features of the attempt—roughly, its 
semantical features. So, for example, recognition that was based largely on 
information about the act that was acquired in some other way—say, by 
testimony—would not suffice for successful performance (Searle 1969: 47–
50). And third, the necessary condition is not presented as a requirement on 
successful performance, but only as a requirement on fully successful 
performance. We’ll return below to what the distinction between successful 
and fully successful performance might amount to. 
For our purposes, the third qualification is the most important. It is 
captured in a particular way in McDowell’s version of Searle’s proposal: 
 
The primary communicative intention is the intention, for instance, to 
say such-and-such to the audience. The appropriate mutual awareness 
is awareness that the speaker has indeed said that such-and-such to the 
audience. Speech acts are publications of intentions; the primary aim of 
speech is to produce an object—the speech act itself—that is 
perceptible publicly, and in particular to the audience, embodying an 
intention whose content is precisely a recognizable performance of that 
very speech act. Recognition by an audience that such an intention has 
been made public in this way leaves nothing further needing to happen 
for the intention to be fulfilled. (McDowell 1980: 41.) 
 18 
 
McDowell’s version imposes conditions that are apt to seem in some ways 
more demanding, and in some ways less demanding, than Searle’s. One 
respect in which McDowell’s version is apt to seem more demanding than 
Searle’s is that, while Searle localises the uptake condition with the audience, 
McDowell suggests that uptake involves mutual awareness on behalf of the 
speaker and their audience. For present purposes, the more important seeming 
difference concerns the shift from Searle’s specification of conditions as 
involving recognition to McDowell’s specification of conditions as involving 
only recognizability. Since it is possible for the performance of an act to be 
recognizable without being recognised, but not vice versa, this is apt to seem 
a respect in which McDowell’s conditions are weaker than Searle’s. 
However, since being recognised entails being recognizable, McDowell’s 
version agrees with Searle’s in making recognition a sufficient condition for 
successful performance. Furthermore, since it is possible for an act to be 
recognizable without being recognised, McDowell’s version endorses what 
Searle’s leaves open, that recognition is not a necessary condition on 
successful performance. On the reasonable assumption that aiming to make 
one’s performance of an act recognizable is characteristically at the service 
of having it be recognised, McDowell could allow a reasonable sense in 
which a recognizable but unrecognised attempt would amount to a successful 
performance whilst failing to be fully successful. The act of telling would 
have been performed successfully but the characteristic intention with which 
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the act was undertaken—the intention that the act be recognised—would not 
have been fulfilled. 
Hornsby articulates a closely related account of the illocutionary 
boundary, drawing on the idea of reciprocity: 
 
When reciprocity obtains between people, they are such as to recognise 
one another’s speech as it is meant to be taken. (Hornsby 1994: 192.) 
 
Her idea is that reciprocity is a standing power of certain groups of people 
such that members of each group are able to recognise some of the 
communicative acts attempted by members of the group, and so members of 
the group are able to perform communicative acts that are recognizable by 
members of the group. Hornsby’s account of the illocutionary boundary is 
then the following: 
 
Allowing ourselves a background of reciprocity, illocutionary acts 
might be circumscribed thus: 
 
j-ing is an illocutionary act iff a sufficient condition of a person’s 
j-ing that p [for arbitrary p] is that an attempt on her part at j-ing 
that p causes an audience to take her to be j-ing that p.  
 




Hornsby’s condition for being an illocutionary act is framed by appeal to an 
audience’s taking an attempt to perform an act in a particular way—namely, 
as a successful performance of the act. On the face of it, Hornsby’s condition 
is weaker than the analogous conditions imposed by Searle and McDowell, 
on which the sufficient condition for successful performance involves 
recognition. Amending Hornsby’s condition so that it incorporated 
recognition, rather than taking, would deliver the following: 
 
(R1) j-ing is an illocutionary act iff a sufficient condition of a person’s 
j-ing that p [for arbitrary p] is that an attempt on her part at j-ing 
that p causes an audience to recognise her to be j-ing that p.  
 
Since recognising that an audience is j-ing that p plausibly requires taking it 
that the audience is j-ing that p, but not vice versa, one could meet Hornsby’s 
condition without meeting (R1), but not vice versa. Now it might be thought 
that other features of Hornsby’s position bring it closer to (R1). One such 
feature is her appeal to “a background of reciprocity,” and a natural reading 
of her proposal is that the takings to which she appeals must be the upshot of 
exercises of the power of reciprocity. Since the power of reciprocity is a 
(collectively instanced) recognitional capacity, that would make her takings 
the upshots of such exercises. Furthermore, Hornsby’s condition specifies 
that the taking to which it appeals must be caused by an appropriate attempt 
at j-ing. Finally, on Hornsby’s proposal, an audience’s taking it that a speaker 
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is j-ing that p would suffice for the speaker’s j-ing that p, so there is a form 
of non-accidental connection here between takings and truth. One might 
expect, therefore, that the form of taking to which she appeals is a fairly close 
approximation to recognising. (Since recognising plausibly entails knowing, 
some of the remaining distance between the accounts will be due to the 
distance between, on one hand, knowledge about events and, on the other 
hand, beliefs about events that are the upshot of exercises of capacities to 
know that are causally triggered by the target events.) Still, one might 
naturally retain a preference for an account framed by appeal to recognition 
over one framed by appeal to the weaker attitude of taking. 
In fact, however, there is a good reason for Hornsby to frame her 
account by appeal to taking rather than recognising. For (R1) fails to mark a 
useful distinction between illocutionary and other acts. Like knowing, 
recognising is factive: recognising that p entails that p. It follows, for arbitrary 
j, that if someone, A, recognises someone, B, to be j-ing, then B is j-ing. So, 
it is a sufficient condition for the successful performance of any act, and not 
only an illocutionary act, that someone recognise one to be doing it. This is 
the reason why Searle and McDowell do not specify their sufficient condition 
for successful performance by appeal to recognition of performance, but 
appeal instead to recognition of attempt (Searle) or intention (McDowell). 
Thus, the closest alternative to Hornsby’s proposal framed by appeal to 
recognition would be this: 
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(R2) j-ing is an illocutionary act iff a sufficient condition of a person’s 
j-ing that p [for arbitrary p] is that an attempt on her part at j-ing 
that p causes an audience to recognise her to be attempting to j 
that p.  
 
Proposals of this form are required either to appeal to an appropriately weak 
attitude—e.g. taking rather than recognising—or an appropriately weak 
object—e.g. attempting rather than succeeding. 
Hornsby agrees with Searle and McDowell not only that a form of 
uptake is sufficient for illocutionary success, but also that that form of uptake 
is not necessary for success (Hornsby 1994: 197). And she helpfully 
articulates an account of why uptake might nonetheless be necessary for fully 
successful performance: 
 
There is surely something right about thinking that performances of 
illocutionary acts in the absence of reciprocity are in some way 
defective. For such performances are not such as to further the usual 
communicative ends of language. Someone who does an illocutionary 
act in spite of the fact that, in the particular case, her action does not 
have the effect characteristic of such an act, is not fully understood: she 
is likely, for instance, to be frustrated in doing any perlocutionary acts 
she might have intended to go in for. (Hornsby 1994: 198.) 
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Hornsby’s idea is that non-defective—that is, fully successful—performance 
of illocutionary acts depends on more than mere successful performance. For 
the performance of such acts is usually not an end in itself, but rather a means 
to the attainment of further ends. (For the stronger claim that the performance 
of illocutionary acts is never an end in itself, see Davidson 1984: 272.) And 
achieving those further ends often depends on uptake. In the absence of 
reciprocity, then, illocutionary performance would lose much of its point. So, 
although uptake is not a necessary condition on individual illocutionary 
performance, it is close to a necessary condition on worthwhile performance 
and, hence, on maintenance of the practice (Hornsby 1994: 198–200. See also 
Bird 1981: 361–366). 
 
 
5. Taking stock. 
We are now in a position to frame a range of proposals about the connection 
between illocutionary acts and understanding, along two main dimensions. 
Along the first dimension, the question is whether understanding, or 
understandability, are necessary or sufficient conditions on illocutionary 
success. The second dimension concerns the operative conception of 
understanding. So, along the first dimension, we have the following views, 
where j is restricted to illocutionary acts: 
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(US1) A sufficient condition of a person’s j-ing that p [for 
arbitrary p; henceforth suppressed] is that an attempt on her 
part at j-ing that p is understood by her audience. 
 
(UN1) A necessary condition of a person’s j-ing that p is that an 
attempt on her part at j-ing that p is understood by her 
audience. 
 
(US2) A sufficient condition of a person’s j-ing that p is that an 
attempt on her part at j-ing that p is understandable by her 
audience. 
 
(UN2) A necessary condition of a person’s j-ing that p is that an 
attempt on her part at j-ing that p is understandable by her 
audience. 
 
The two main conceptions of understanding, and so understandability, that 
have been operative in the foregoing can then be captured in the following 
ways: 
 
(REC) An audience understands an attempt on a speaker’s part at 
j-ing that p iff the audience recognises the speaker to be 
attempting to j that p. 
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(TAK)  An audience understands an attempt on a speaker’s part at 
j-ing that p iff the audience takes the speaker to be j-ing 
that p. 
 
As we saw in considering Searle’s and Hornsby’s proposals, there are some 
grounds for imposing further restrictions on the modes of recognition or 
taking employed in versions of (REC) and (TAK). If that is right, then one 
way of imposing those restrictions would be via appeal to specific modes of 
sensitivity to the illocutionary force and content of attempts at j-ing that p, 
or to the more basic features of actions that help to comprise them as acts with 
that force and content. As well as underpinning the specific modes of 
recognition or taking that figure in (REC) and (TAK), such specific modes of 
sensitivity might also play some of the cognitive roles of instances of 
recognising, or taking, a speaker to be attempting to j that p. Thus, such 
sensitivity might be exercised without issuing in recognition or taking, and 
yet its exercise might still have some of the downstream cognitive 
consequences usually attributed to recognition or taking. (For one recent 
attempt to articulate the required form of sensitivity, and the upshots of its 
exercise, see Longworth 2018.) Using “primitive understanding” as a label 
for the upshot of exercises of the proposed form of sensitivity, a further 
conception of the mode of understanding that figures in uptake conditions 
would be the following: 
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(UND) An audience understands an attempt on a speaker’s part at 
j-ing that p iff the audience primitively understands the 
speaker to be (attempting) j-ing that p. 
 
Twelve initial options arise from our brief survey, the pairs (US1) + (UN1), 
(US1) + (UN2), (US2) + (UN1), and (US2) + (UN2), each pair taking the 
three forms made available by (REC), (TAK), and (UND). However, since 
meeting the weaker sufficient condition, (US2), doesn’t guarantee meeting 
the stronger necessary condition, (UN1), we can exclude the three (US2) + 
(UN1) options, leaving nine options. I’ve also suggested that, although the 
views that we’ve considered here are presented as if they took the (US1) 
forms, on which understanding is sufficient for successful performance, the 
fact that understanding entails understandability means that they can also be 
captured by appeal to the weaker (US2) forms, on which understandability 
suffices for success. On the view shared by Searle, McDowell, and Hornsby, 
that the (US2) forms appropriately specify sufficient conditions—and, in 
particular, that the (UN1) forms don’t appropriately specify necessary 
conditions—we would thereby be in a position also to exclude the six (US1) 
options, leaving only the three (US2) + (UN2) options. However, whether 
those options ought to be excluded turns on the question whether uptake is a 
necessary condition on performance, and although Searle, McDowell, and 
Hornsby appear to agree that it isn’t, others have demurred. (For discussion, 
see e.g., de Gaynesford 2011, 2018; Langton 1993; Moran 2018.) 
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Rather than pursuing further the harried question whether uptake is 
necessary for successful illocutionary performance, I’d like briefly to 
consider the question whether (US2) can be used to specify the illocutionary 
boundary by considering again the standing of telling and informing. Hornsby 
follows Searle (and Austin 1962: 162) in counting telling as an illocutionary 
act, and considers the following objection: 
 
[An] objection to treating telling as illocutionary may come from 
someone who thinks (a) that no one is told that p unless he becomes 
informed that p; and (b) that a piece of recognition cannot make the 
difference to whether someone comes to be informed that p. (Hornsby 
1994: 202.) 
 
Now Hornsby presents the worry here as directed towards her inclusion of 
telling amongst the illocutionary acts. However, the objection that she 
considered to so treating telling is bound up with her own proposal about 
necessary and sufficient conditions on an act’s being illocutionary. Thus, the 
worry could equally be viewed as one to the effect that telling should be 
included amongst the illocutionary acts even though it would appear to be 
excluded by Hornsby’s proposal. For Hornsby’s proposal tells us that in order 
for telling to be an illocutionary act, taking an attempt to be a telling must 
suffice for successful telling, while the objection alleges that successful 
telling requires, in addition, at least accepting what one is told. On either 
construal of the worry it would be open to Hornsby to respond that “it is a 
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matter of theoretical decision how to use ‘illocutionary’” (Hornsby 1994: 195 
fn.20). However, Hornsby instead presents a two-pronged response: 
 
(a) It is not obvious that we cannot tell people things that they reject 
and thus do not become informed of…. (b) Awareness of what a 
speaker is up to can be part and parcel not only of understanding but 
also of the actual communication of facts. (Hornsby 1994: 203.) 
 
The first prong, (a), is a straightforward rejection of the objector’s claim (a), 
and I allowed earlier, in discussing Grice (§3), that it is plausible that there 
are forms of telling on which it does not require the audience to become 
informed. However, that leaves open that there might be other forms of telling 
that are subject to the stronger condition. The second prong, (b), rejects the 
objector’s (b), but less straightforwardly.  
Although Hornsby doesn’t elaborate, one natural attempt to develop the 
idea that awareness of what a speaker is up to can be part and parcel of the 
communication of facts would be the following. Telling someone something 
as the objector conceives it—or, perhaps better, informing someone of 
something—is, in part, a matter of letting them know something that one 
knows. Fully successful performance of such an act would therefore require 
that one possessed the operative knowledge. And recognising such a 
performance would require recognising the speaker’s possession of that 
knowledge. Suppose that one thereby recognised that the speaker knows that 
p. Since knowledge is factive, the speaker cannot know that p unless p. 
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Assuming, then, that the audience knows that obvious truth about knowledge, 
their recognising that the speaker knows that p will put them in a position to 
detach, and thereby come to know that p for themselves.  
Alternatively, merely taking it that the speaker has spoken 
knowledgeably would require one to take it that p, whether or not that taking 
amounted to a case of recognising. And something similar would hold even 
where the sufficient condition for success was recognition of an attempt. 
Attempting an act of informing doesn’t obviously require one to satisfy 
sufficient conditions for being in a position successfully to inform and, so, 
doesn’t obviously require one to possess the operative knowledge. However, 
it plausibly does require one to take it that one possesses the operative 
knowledge. Consequently, fulfilling the sufficient condition for the speaker’s 
telling one something by recognising their attempt would require recognising 
that the speaker takes it that they possess the operative knowledge. By the 
factiveness of knowledge, the speaker couldn’t take it that they know that p 
without, thereby, taking it that p. So, recognising that the speaker takes it that 
they know that p translates into recognising that the speaker takes it that p. 
The last two proposals give rise to significant mismatches between the 
primary aim of informing, that the audience comes to share the knowledge 
that p, and the proposed upshots of understanding, that the audience take it 
that p, or take it that the speaker takes it that p. If that is right, then one might 
hope that versions of Hornsby’s (b) response could be buttressed by an 
appropriate (a) response, on which illocutionary informing aims at less than 
the sharing of knowledge. However, it is a matter of some delicacy whether 
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that could work, since the (a) response would seem to depend on the fact that 
informing aims at sharing knowledge. By contrast, the first proposal 
harmonises well with the primary aim of informing. However, since it appeals 
to the recognition of acts, rather than attempts, it is of the wrong form to figure 
in an account of the bounds of illocution (see again §4). 
The upshot is that acts aimed constitutively at sharing knowledge 
plausibly cannot be counted by the present proposals as illocutionary, since 
understanding them is plausibly insufficient for full success. I leave open the 
question whether such acts include forms of telling and, if they do, whether it 
is reasonable to exclude those forms of telling from the class of illocutionary 
acts. (But see again the discussion of Grice in §3.) 
My aim has been to gain clarity about some answers that have been 
offered to the question whether understanding is necessary or sufficient for 
telling or for the successful performance of illocutionary acts more generally. 
I outlined a way in which Austin’s idea that understanding plays a central role 
in illocution (§2) has been developed, first by Grice (§3) and then by Searle, 
McDowell, and Hornsby (§4). On the basis of that discussion, I set out some 
of the major options for connecting illocution and understanding and raised 
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